Abstract-This paper demonstrates a comprehensive analysis method using formal methods such as finite-state machine. First, we describe the modified version of our new protocol and briefly explain the encrypt-then-authenticate mechanism, which is regarded as more a secure mechanism than the one used in our protocol. Then, we use a finite-state verification to study the behaviour of each machine created for each phase of the protocol and examine their behaviours together. Modelling with finitestate machines shows that the modified protocol can function correctly and behave properly even with invalid input or time delay.
INTRODUCTION
Security protocols are becoming the core subject in communication systems and verifying them has gained significant attention by researchers and developers. Security analysis aims to formally guarantee these protocols to satisfy their specifications and they can function soundly. Security evaluation is a fundamental step in the development of security protocols. The methods used to analyse security protocols can be categorised into two groups: methods based on analytical approach and methods based on simulation. The analytical approach offers accurate results and provides a clear perception of the system characteristics. However, this approach becomes unreliable when dealing with high complex system. Therefore, the latter approach, simulation approach, has become more popular in system analysis. Simulation tools, such as finite-state machines and Petri nets, expose progress in two directions: one related to the development of faster methods during execution of mathematical algorithms [1] , and the other associated with the effectiveness simulation presentations and results [2] .
Protocol modelling is a crucial step in designing security protocols. It contributes to diminishing ambiguity and misinterpretation of protocol specifications. For example, modelling a protocol using finite-state machine can help to understand how it will interact with the changes and how it will behave with invalid inputs. A Finite-State Machine (FSM) is a powerful tool to simulate software architecture and communication protocols. FSM can only model the control part of a system and consists of a finite number of states, a finite number of events, and a finite number of transitions.
Modelling with finite-state machine helps to understand the behaviour of complex protocol. Also, it offers accurate results and provides a clear perception of the system characteristics. The analysis presented in this paper covers the process of the three-way handshake used to negate the session key and examine the behaviours of the protocol and enumerates all possible states it can reach.
The structure of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review previous works on extended finite-state machine and briefly discuss the weakness in our new protocol and present modified version of it. In Section 3, we model the modified protocol using EFSM. We then provide a brief discussion on security analysis in Section 4. Finally, the conclusions are given in Section 5.
II. REVIEW OF RELATED WORK

A. Extended Finite-State Machines
In order to model the complex behaviour of the proposed protocol, an extended model of FSM is considered. According to [3] , EFSM helps to comprehend the state space complexity of a system when the number of states and transitions increases Also, they emphasise the importance of introducing state variables in FSM models. State variable play a key role in modelling because they can "define a range of arithmetic and logical operators to manipulate state variables and trigger transitions based on logical primitives" [3] . Moreover, EFSM with variables can transfer variable values from one model to another. Consequently, the produced output value from one machine can be consumed by other machines. With the introduction of variables, EFSM allows one to model a system with conditions. Transitions may have guards and predicates, which consist of operations or Boolean-valued expressions that can depend on input variables [3] .
A formal definition of an EFSM is as follows [3, 4] :
S is a set of states, T is a set of transitions, E is a set of events, and V is a store represented by a set of variables. Transitions have a source state source(t) ∈ S, a target state target(t) ∈ S and a label lbl(t). Transition labels are of the form e1[c]/a where e1 ∈ E, c is a condition and a is a sequence of actions. 
B. Review of Proposed Protocol
In our previous work [5] , we have developed a new authentication protocol that allows remote mutual authentication with key agreement. Our new protocol is based on biometric verification and ID-based Cryptograph. However, it is not secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks.
The new protocol needs modifications to initiate secure authentication between the client and server.
The modified version of the proposed protocol should improve security and provide users with better authentication and data confidentiality. To address and correct the perceived security weakness in the proposed protocol, authenticating the ciphertext by applying encrypt-then-authenticate mechanism is considered to be one of the secure methods for security 
Encrypt (Message || MAC)
The new modification for the message exchange will be constructed as this [7, 8] :
Encrypt (Message) || MAC
This way the MAC is covering the entire ciphertext to preserve the integrity of the cipher message. The MAC value is then appended to the encrypted message. When the recipient receives the authenticated encrypted message, the MAC should be evaluated before attempting to decrypt the ciphertext. If the MAC verification fails, the recipient will terminate the session immediately. This process will be efficient by eliminating the time spent to going through the manipulated data. The enhancements for the proposed protocol will only affect part of the registration phase and the authentication and key agreement phase. Additionally, enclosing the identity of the server along with the client's identity can mitigate the impact of masquerading attack. The ID's of entities must be unique in the network. Thus, the entities that wish to communicate are aware of each other. The modified protocol is summarised in Fig. 1 . Based on the investigation above, we need to modify the state machine described in [5, 6] according to the new enhancements.
IV. PROTOCOL MODEL AND STATE MACHINE
The EFSM is used to model the communication channel of the proposed protocol between the Client C i and the Server S i . Since the exchange of packets follows a pattern defined by a finite set of rules, each principal in the protocol has a corresponding state machine: EFSM server , EFSM register and EFSM client .
A. Verifier EFSM
The EFSMverifier is an embedded machine within EFSM client and EFSM server where states themselves can have other machines. To be precise, it is a set of sub-states that are integrated as a nested finite state machine which are inside the states S5 and S6 in EFSM server and state C6 in the EFSM client .It is only activated when the authentication and key agreement have started. The FSM verifier is triggered when it obtains authentication information from FSM client or FSM server . It represents various transitions during the authentication and validation process. This machine is modelled using 5 states and 8 transitions. 
At any stage of EFSM server activity, EFSM server aborts the current session and changes to state S9 if the timeout exceeds the defined TIME_WAIT while waiting for packets. This feature helps to prevent an infinite wait when the EFSM client fails to respond.
C. Client EFSM
The EFSM at the client side represents the various ongoing transmissions with the server at any point in time. It is modelled using 9 states, 22 transitions, and one nested EFSM as detailed below. Fig. 4 shows the transition diagram for the EFSM client and Table 3 describes the transitions specifications. 
D. Register EFSM
The EFSM at the registration side represents the various ongoing transmissions with the server and client at any point in time. It is modelled using EFSM with 4 states and 7 transitions. Fig. 5 
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The capability to detect errors and vulnerability is substantial in protocol design implementation. Since communication protocols are partially specified, the finite state approach provides a flexible way to handle invalid inputs and ambiguous specifications, which are usually unspecified or vague in protocol design. Testing the proposed protocol with FSM helps to verify whether the protocol complies with its specification or not. Modelling with FSM shows that the proposed protocol can function correctly and behave properly even with invalid input or time delay.
The state machine in Fig. 6 represents the result of combing the three machines together. The composite model executes efficiently and handles errors in a safe way and it performs certain actions in case of unreliable state. Each valid and reachable state generates a valid protocol state and the transitions can be triggered by either events or guards. Based on the equivalent behaviour, each machine may follow nondeterministic behaviour and produce different outputs according to the original input. For example, if EFSM client generates an illogical input for the authentication process then EFSM client rejects the session and goes to the terminate state. Predicating and considering all possible combinations of both desirable and undesirable states are one mean to fully understand the complexity of the proposed protocol.
Note that the states S9 and C9 are defined in terms of a timeout being reached with an inability to complete the mutual authentication. www.ijarai.thesai.org
The states S4 and C4 are defined in terms of an invalid input being injected due to invalid ID, wrong password, or unmatched biometric. The states S8 and C8 are defined in the case of unreliable actions being performed for example, if the integrity or validity check failed. Furthermore, a state machine hierarchy or hierarchical FSM is used to provide a more concrete level of refinement; FSM register can be refined by introducing an "Enrol" feature. This state determines if the client is pre-enrolled or not. The state R0 becomes a new EFSM with three states R1, R2, R3 as described previously. This error can pose serious threat because it would occur if the data has been modified or injected.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper started by giving a brief definition of extended finite state machines (EFSM). Then it elaborates the details of the finite-state verification of the modified protocol and identifies the functionality of each phase. Also, it studies the behaviour of each machine created for each phase and how they interrelate.
The composite model executes efficiently and handles error in a safe way according to their types. The modified protocol connection progresses from one state to another based on the data pertained from the message exchanged. EFSM helps to understand the behaviour of the protocol and logs any unwanted behaviours. This mechanism is very useful for determining the types of errors the protocol experiences during running and it can be useful to later on investigate what causes these errors and learn from them.
In future, an in-depth security analysis and evaluation will be conducted via Petri Net (PN). PN will be used to simulate the communication patterns between the server and the client as well as to validate the protocol functionality. First, we will model the protocol without an intruder. Then, we will add the intruder to the model and implement a token-passing scheme. At this stage, we will test different attacks, such as impersonation attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and replay attack against the modified protocol and verify the security requirements. After analysis with PN, we will do a comparison between the previous protocol [5] and the modified version of it.
